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TOPIC IV.D.2
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
Informal Agency Actions and U.S. Administrative Law
- Informal Procedure in a Global Era
I. INTRODUCTION
Informal agency actions in the United States have been de-
scribed as "the lifeblood of the administrative process,"' constituting
nothing less than "the everyday business of an administrative
agency's agenda."2 Despite, or perhaps, because of the breadth of
these descriptions, there never has been a particularly good defini-
tion of informal agency actions. They usually are defined negatively
- that is, they are those actions not covered by the formal adjudica-
tory and rulemaking provisions of the U.S. Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). Informal actions in the U.S. thus constitute a residual cat-
egory of agency actions, encompassing a great variety of governmen-
tal actions that take a number of administrative forms.
The General Reporter suggests a definitional conception of infor-
mal agency actions based on their legally non-binding effects against
citizens and/or administrative agency units. Administrative guide-
lines, warnings, advice and the like are given as examples of this
kind of action, relating to citizens. Working with this broad concep-
tual definition, the general reporter also suggests three types of such
informal administrative action: (1) those "addressed to subordinate
administrative organs (officers) and... legally binding on them but
not directly on citizens ... ; (2) actions addressed to subordinate ad-
ministrative organs but .. . legally binding neither on them nor on
citizens"; and (3) actions which are addressed directly to citizens but
are not legally binding on them..."
This paper shall focus primarily on the third category, those in-
formal actions that affect citizens directly, as well as those that are,
at least, initially, legally non-binding. Two areas of informal agency
action shall be explored and, in so doing, we shall see that "binding"
ALFRED C. AMAN JR., is Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington.
1. Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941).
2. Alfred C. Aman Jr. & William Mayton, Administrative Law Treatise 257
(1992).
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is a relative term. Part III of this paper shall first consider a variety
of informal actions described generally as administrative equity.
Waivers, exceptions, declaratory orders and the like are sometimes
binding on the party that seeks them, but they are sought volunta-
rily. The "voluntary" nature of exceptions applications is, however,
usually based on the costs of the regulation they seek to have waived;
they are not binding until they are "voluntarily" sought, but there are
often strong incentives to pursue such relief. Declaratory orders and
more informal agency advice, however, usually result in nonbinding,
but persuasive agency action. This paper shall then consider condi-
tional orders and so-called voluntary commitments that become bind-
ing only because the applicants or potential licensees "voluntarily"
agree to these conditions.
To set the basic analytic framework within which to examine in-
formal agency actions in general, as well as the role that conditions
and administrative equity play in particular, Part II shall first con-
sider the role that informal agency actions have played historically in
the United States. In so doing, we shall examine the nature of the
kinds of cases and regulatory programs that lend themselves to infor-
mal actions, as well as certain considerations involving the timing of
the informal actions taken. We also shall consider the relationship of
procedure to the underlying philosophical premises that govern the
role that the state plays or is expected to play in administering these
regulatory regimes. Closely related to this analysis are three addi-
tional factors: the increasingly important questions involving the
amount of governmental resources available for carrying out regula-
tory missions, the economic, promotional aspect of the substantive
regulatory programs involved, and the degree of regulatory intrusive-
ness into market processes represented by various regulatory
regimes.
II. INFORMAL AGENCY ACTIONS AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The 1940 Report to the Attorney General on Administrative Pro-
cedure made very clear not only the importance, but the widespread
nature of informal actions in American administrative law:3
Every administrative agency is charged with administering
or enforcing, in the field which Congress has marked out for
it, provisions of law which affect private interests. To do this
requires the investigation and decision of great numbers of
particular cases. In most of these, resort may be had to for-
mal proceedings with testimony of witnesses, stenographic




record, briefs, arguments, and findings of fact or opinion.
But despite the fact that formal procedure is generally avail-
able, it is of the utmost importance to understand the large
part played by informal procedure in the administrative pro-
cess. In the great majority of cases an investigation and a
preliminary decision suffice to settle the matter. Compara-
tively few cases flower into controversies in which the par-
ties take conflicting positions of such moment to them that
resort is necessary to the procedure of the courtroom.
That report went on to make clear that "the great bulk of administra-
tive decisions are made informally and by mutual consent."4 In so
doing, it discussed various contexts in which such informality was
likely, such as, for example, the investigatory stage of tax regulation.
Millions of returns are filed each year; hundreds of thousands of au-
dits occur, and hundreds of thousands of adjustments are made. A
few of these adjustments lead to formal proceedings, but most deci-
sions to make these adjustments are made informally. The sheer
number of applications or returns involved necessitates such coopera-
tion if this kind of regulation is to work. There have, therefore, to be
persuasive reasons and effective incentives for taxpayers to operate
informally and to accept such informal governmental determinations.
The relative clarity of the tax law involved, the costs of more formal
dispute processes, the ultimate sanctions involved if taxes are not
timely paid and the likelihood of prosecutorial success in cases where
audits are done and disagreements persist are important factors mili-
tating in favor of informal resolution of tax disputes. Formal proceed-
ings generally are likely to be used in difficult cases where the law is
not clear and much is at stake.
The 1940 Attorney General's Report also focused on regulatory
regimes and decisions that turn on inspections and tests. As the Re-
port notes, "the soundest procedure in cases of this type is that which
recognizes the reality that the inspection or test is and must be the
decisive element .... Protection, in cases such as these, can be af-
forded by a right to reexamination or reinspection by another and
more experienced inspector, far more than by any right to a formal
hearing before an official who must merely listen to testimony."5
Another category of cases are those involving "large numbers of
claims and license applications."6 As the Report notes, "in cases of
this type formal proceedings in the first instance are undesirable
from the point of the individual and the Government. The number of
cases alone makes such formal proceedings impossible without in-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 37-38.
6. Id. at 38.
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creasing personnel out of all reason."7 Finally, the 1940 Report points
to other regulatory contexts in which informality is regularly the
norm: those involving emergency agency actions that must be taken
before any formal proceedings are possible," or consent dispositions
prior to issuance of a formal complaint.9
All of these types of cases - mass justice cases involving enor-
mous numbers of applicants, investigatory cases involving distinct,
individual factual situations, emergency situations necessitating that
the government act first and hear later, and consensual dispositions
were generated, in large part (but not exclusively), by various New
Deal regulatory regimes then taking hold. Since 1940, and especially
since 1946, when the Administrative Procedure Act was passed,
these kinds of cases and the informality that accompanied their dis-
position have remained an important part of U.S. administrative law,
even with the level of deregulation that occurred in the 1980's.10 The
Administrative Procedure Act itself recognized certain informal ac-
tions in Section 555(e).11 More important, section 706(a) of the APA,
in effect, labelled agency action not covered by the APA as "commit-
ted to agency discretion." 12 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe,13 however, the Supreme Court construed this provision nar-
rowly, thereby potentially subjecting a great deal of informal agency
action to judicial review. Informal agency actions, however, have long
been and remain a very important part of U.S. administrative law.
Even if judicial review is possible, the timing, stakes and nature of
the transactions involved often render judicial review impractical.
Since passage of the APA, a second wave of regulatory law and
new regulatory structures have come into being. This regulatory ex-
pansion occurred largely in the late 1960's and especially throughout
the 1970's, and it resulted in the establishment of a variety of new
environmental, health and safety regulatory regimes and struc-
tures. 14 The new regulation involved was detailed, far reaching and
created just as much a need for informal agency action, if not more,
as existed under the more economically and single industry oriented
7. Id. at 39.
8. Id. at 40.
9. Id. at 41.
10. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law In A Global Era, Chapter 2
(1992).
11. Section 555(e) states that "prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole
or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person
made in connection with an agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or
when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief state-
ment of the grounds for denial.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a). See generally, Shapiro, "APA: Past, Present and Future," 72
Va. L. Rev. 447, 452-54 (1986).
13. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
14. See generally, Aman, "Administrative Law in the United States, Past, Present
and Future," 16 Queens L.J. 179, 188-190 (1991).
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regulatory missions of New Deal agencies. Safety and health regula-
tions created new emergency situations, often requiring quick, effec-
tive governmental action. Meanwhile, the expansion of welfare and
disability programs in the 1970's also created just as much pressure
for efficient adjudication of non-controversial cases, if these programs
were to function effectively. Since these new programs did not sup-
plant the pre-existing New Deal structures of the past, the reasons
for and the economic programs in which the informal action outlined
in the 1940 Report was taken continued. In addition, the new overlay
of even more detailed and sweeping regulation often required even
more administrative flexibility. Thus, there is little doubt that infor-
mal agency actions should remain the "lifeblood of the administrative
process;"15 however, for a variety of reasons there has also been, over
time, an increasing degree of formalization or judicialization of vari-
ous administrative processes.
The underlying consensus supporting the New Deal and the 1946
APA has always represented an uneasy compromise between those
who favored market solutions to economic problems, and thus, dis-
trusted government, and those who advocated affirmative govern-
mental intervention, and thus, had more faith in the ability of
government to achieve collective economic goals. 16 As the APA has
matured, and as the relatively uneasy consensus underlying the role
of government as defined by that Act began to break down, increasing
formalization, usually in the form of judicialization, but also in the
form of more complicated congressional procedural mandates could
be observed. Those that distrusted government often sought proce-
dural protection from the government. Even those inclined to trust
governmental action began to suspect that government was too easily
captured by the regulatory interests it was presumed to regulate.
Such philosophical presuppositions vis-a-vis the vulnerability of
agencies also often militated in favor of more procedure, more trans-
parency and, ultimately, less informality.
Perhaps the most dramatic change in procedural approaches in
the 1970's compared to the New Deal era came in the form of the
legislative procedures mandated for rulemaking in the environmen-
tal, health and safety contexts. The relatively minimal procedures
provided by the informal rulemaking provisions of Section 553 of the
APA were substantially increased with hybrid rule-making proce-
dures, incorporating aspects of adjudication into the rulemaking pro-
cess. 17 Judicialization of the administrative process also increased,
15. Atty. Gen. Report, supra n. 1, at 35.
16. See Shapiro, supra n. 12; see also, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950).
17. For a discussion of such statutes and a brief history of three eras of adminis-
trative law - the New Deal, the Environmental and the Global eras - see Aman,
supra n. 10.
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giving rise to far more complicated regulated structures and
rulemaking procedures than previously existed at the outset of the
New Deal. If anything, such formalization of the rulemaking process
accentuated the need for or, in any event, the use of, more informal
agency procedures such as exceptions and waivers (see below), but
this increasing formalization was, perhaps, both a forerunner to and
a partial cause of the deregulation movement that took hold in the
1980's. The regulatory paralysis in which some of these procedural
demands resulted made it more difficult and more costly for many
agencies to regulate, quite apart from the more ideological question of
whether such regulation should occur at all. For some, regulation re-
mained unnecessary; but for others, it seemed, unfortunately, ineffec-
tive and ultimately not worth its cost.
A part of the deregulation movement in the 1980's was thus
grounded in the ideological belief that many governmental actions
could and should be completely displaced by the market. Not unlike
the laissez-faire era of the early 20th century, such a view tended to
see governmental action as unnecessarily intrusive and violative of
individual economic rights. Procedure was necessary as an essential
form of protection from the government. Depending upon the degree
of market intrusiveness involved, the more the better. On the other
hand, a second strand of the deregulatory era of the 1980's tended to
see the market more as an effective regulatory tool. Thus, market
principles and incentive regulation were viewed not in opposition to
government, but as an effective form of collective action. As I have
argued elsewhere, the global era in which we now live and the fre-
quency and intensity of global competition affecting most regulated
industries has made such market approaches more and more attrac-
tive. The costs of domestic regulation now stand out in stark relief
when compared to other countries that have little or no regulatory
costs and low labor costs as well.' 8 Thus, it is in this context that
market regulatory approaches are encouraged. The procedures used,
like the substantive regulation involved, are judged in terms of their
efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, rather than procedural protection
from the government, procedures are to advance a new, more market
oriented approach to government.
It is this second philosophical strand of the deregulation move-
ment that is reflected in the recent report issued by Vice President
Gore's task force on re-inventing government. 19 This report advocates
a wide variety of reforms aimed at streamlining and downsizing gov-
ernment, thereby making it more efficient and effective. The market
18. Id.
19. Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, "From




and market forces are to be harnessed for the public good. Govern-
ment intervention is viewed positively, but its costs must be mini-
mized. Informality goes hand in hand with a more efficient approach
to government. Informal actions can more easily accomplish certain
governmental objectives in a more cost-effective way than approaches
accompanied by formal procedural approaches. The 1990's, at least
the 1990's of the Clinton Administration, thus promise to be a regula-
tory era in which procedure is not used to thwart government, but
rather to facilitate and further what may be more modest regulatory
goals, goals that try to rely on market forces and less costly and more
informal procedures, where possible.
Quite apart from the philosophical basis of conceptualizing the
market as a regulatory tool is the fact that budgetary constraints on
government in general and agencies in particular are very real. Given
the cuts in federal agency budgets that have and will continue to take
place, doing the same or, if possible, doing more with less resources
and in new, less intrusive ways is very much the motto of federal
administrative agencies today. Budgetary reality, too, will create
pressures to proceed informally and efficiently, whenever possible.
For example, it is likely that as agency budgets are cut, the number
of agency lawyers available to enforce agency rules will be smaller. Of
necessity, they will have to seek more informal methods of enforce-
ment, perhaps having to accept negotiated settlements that appear
far less ambitious when compared to the agency's public interest
goals and the regulatory solutions it may have sought in the past. At
the same time, to the extent that substantive, command-control regu-
latory rules and regimes are replaced with more market oriented, in-
centive based regulatory schemes, such as those in environmental
law that rely more on emissions trading rather than specific rules,
enforcement itself is likely to change. Rather than focusing on indi-
vidual violations of specific regulations, the focus of the future is
more likely to be on broad regulatory targets and goals. Such an ap-
proach may require less in enforcement resources; it is likely to yield
more negotiation, and less formal litigation. 20
In sum, we have entered a new age of administrative law and
reform. It is likely to be one in which informal agency actions remain
at least as important as before and, because of the desire to advance
the various market oriented goals of both the regulated and the agen-
20. Along with the trends toward market based, incentive regulation, there also
are now in place two relatively new statutes that encourage agency settlement and
the use of various alternative dispute resolution techniques at the agency level and a
negotiated approach to rulemaking. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act, in particular,
seeks to encourage negotiating approaches to rulemaking and the production of rules
more appropriate for and more acceptable by the industries to which they apply. See
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 591, et seq. and Negotiated
Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 581, et seq.
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cies involved, such informal action is likely to increase, particularly if
it increases governmental efficiency. It is with this background and
this prediction for the future in mind that we shall now examine two
common and related forms of informal agency actions prevalent in a
variety of administrative programs.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE EQUITY AND CONDITIONAL ORDERS
As noted above, informal agency actions in the U.S. constitute a
residual category. It is impossible to categorize all of the informal ac-
tions and the various contexts within which they occur, but some
types of informal actions occur in many, if not most, federal adminis-
trative agencies. The 1940 Attorney General's Report was able to set
forth certain types of cases and contexts where informal processes are
best used. We can, however, refine these broad categories further and
focus on two specific areas of informal actions which are important
now and are likely to remain significant in the future. These include
what we shall call Administrative Equity - the use of waivers, ex-
ceptions, modifications and the like, and so-called "voluntary commit-
ments" or conditional orders.
Focusing on the use of conditional orders and "voluntary commit-
ments" will enable us to explore the relatively subtle bargaining rela-
tionships that are established in governmental programs that, of
necessity, create relationships between potential licensees or appli-
cants for a regulatory benefit and the grantor of that benefit, the gov-
ernment. This, in turn, will enable us to explore just how voluntary
some of these commitments are in, for example, the context of federal
banking law, where most of this data is drawn from. More generally,
though, this discussion will have applicability to all administrative
processes that require individual applications or licenses to carry on
certain activities.
Focusing on administrative equity, waivers and exceptions, in
particular, will enable us to explore a form of informal action that is
binding on applicants, but voluntarily initiated by them. Such orders
are voluntarily sought to release the applicants involved from the
rules that otherwise would apply.21 We begin with these forms of in-
formal agency actions, first.
A. Administrative Equity
Administrative equity serves as a bridge between general, collec-
tively determined rules and the reality of the particular case. It refers
to a body of substantive principles and norms that, on occasion, may
21. The following sections of this paper in Part III are drawn almost exclusively
from my previous work dealing with administrative equity, and conditions, published
in Alfred Aman and William Mayton, Administrative Law Treatise (1992), Chapter 9.
Parts IIIA and B are reprinted here with permission by West Publishing Company.
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justify the granting of individual exceptions, exemptions or waivers
to rules that generally apply to others. Administrative equity is most
often concerned with the impact of a regulatory scheme on those who
must bear the brunt of its costs. It is usually always the regulated,
not the beneficiaries of the regulation, who seek exceptions or modifi-
cations to agency rules. The principles used by regulators to grant or
deny these requests constitute the substance of administrative eq-
uity. They allow the administrator "to rectify the shortcoming... of
the lawgiver due to the generality of his statement."
22
Exceptions, waivers, modifications, and the like can be grouped
into three broad categories: hardship exceptions, which are based on
the specific factual characteristics of the applicant; policy exceptions
that represent regulatory experiments on the part of the agency; and
fairness exceptions that have to do with whom or which part of an
industry bears the relative burdens of the regulatory costs involved.
The more policy oriented the exceptions become and the less tied they
are to the individual factual circumstances of the applicants involved,
the more the agency risks making major decisions under the guise of
individual, informal actions. Such decisions would not necessarily be
known to the public at large and clearly would be a misuse of the
basic purposes of informal administrative equitable relief: to mini-
mize regulatory costs by enabling applicants to achieve regulatory
goals in a cost effective way.
Administrative equity takes many forms. For example, the De-
partment of Energy Act confers on the Secretary specific power to
make adjustments to rules of general applicability.23 Adjustments in-
clude exceptions, exemptions, modifications, rescissions, and inter-
pretations. Similarly, other agencies provide opportunities for
modifications 24 and waivers, 25 no-action letters, 26 variances 27 or rul-
ings. 28 All of these various adjustments provide a mechanism for re-
lief from general rules for individual applicants. They fall into two
broad categories: those that resemble declaratory orders and those
that resemble injunctions.
Some adjustments are closely akin to declaratory orders or advi-
sory opinions.29 Rulings or interpretations, for example, usually in-
22. Id. at 281, citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, at 142 (M. Ostwald
trans. 1962).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7174 (a) (Supp. III 1979).
24. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(2), 316 (a)(1976) (modification).
25. 47 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1989) (waiver procedure) (FCC).
26. See, e.g., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,001.
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1976).
28. FED. Taxes (P-11) 26,708.
29. The APA specifically authorizes the issuance of declaratory orders in the con-
text or formal adjudicatory cases in 5 U.S.C. § 554(e). See generally, Powell, "Sinners,
Supplicants and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in relation to Section 554(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act," 63 N.C. L. Rev. 339, 366 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
"Agency Advice Giving"].
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volve requests to determine whether a particular regulation actually
applies to certain facts and, if so, with what result. Such determina-
tions, made before any agency action has been taken, apply only to
the petitioner. They generally predate any actual dispute between
the agency and a party, are rendered by agency staff and not subject
to judicial review.30 Similarly, rescissions and modifications usually
apply only to particular orders and particular petitioners. Exceptions
to rules, as well as waivers, variances, and the like are more like in-
junctions. The petitioner does not seek a clarification of the applica-
tion of a rule; he seeks an order indicating that the rule does not, in
fact, apply to him at all. This kind of adjustment enjoins the applica-
tion of the rule to the petitioner.3'
These kinds of agency actions usually are authorized by statute.
Some statutes authorize the agency to grant only exceptions to
rules. 32 Others authorize a wide variety of modifications.33 Apart
from statutory authorization, an agency's own rules or policy state-
ments often provide authority for similar exceptions. 34
These statutes or agency rules usually set forth criteria for
granting or denying relief. Some statutes contain broad criteria, giv-
ing the administrator enormous discretion in applying the standards.
For example, the Department. of Energy Organization Act authorizes
the Secretary to grant adjustments if there is "special hardship, ineq-
uity or unfair distribution of burdens[.]" 35 Other acts are more spe-
cific in their criteria. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, for
example, provides that the Secretary of Labor may grant adjust-
ments to allow "reasonable variances, tolerances, and exemptions ...
30. See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643-44 (D.C. Ci. 1974) ("we think mem-
bers of the Commission's staff ... have no authority to make orders". . . .). For an
analysis of the advice-giving role of administrative agencies, see Powell, "Agency Ad-
vice Giving," supra n. 29.
31. There are, in fact, three broad categories of exceptions: hardship exceptions,
fairness exceptions and policy exceptions. See Aman, "Administrative Equity," 1982
Duke L. Rev. at 293-323.
32. See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3412(c) (1988). See gen-
erally, Noland & Penniman, "The FERC Adjustments Process Under Section 502(c) of
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978," 1 Energy L.J. 79 (1980).
33. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 88 1410, 1417 (1988); Federal Mine Safety and Health act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
88 811(c), 811(e), 814(g) (1988); Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4 (1982); Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2155a (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410 (1982); Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 833a (1982); Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(2), 214(a) (1982) (common carriers), 47 U.S.C. §§ 316,
359 (1982) (radio); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1386(b)(1), 1432(c)
(1976).
34. See, e.g., F.P.C. Order No. 467, discussed in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC,
506 F.2d 33 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7194(a) (1982).
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as he may find necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of
the national defense."36
Quite apart from an agency's own enabling act or rules, some
courts have suggested that the authority to grant exceptions to rules
may be implied as well.37 Courts have failed, however, to explain ex-
plicitly the basis of this authority and whether it is statutory or
constitutional.
Agencies provide for equitable adjustments and rulings with va-
rying degrees of informality. At one end of the spectrum, an agency
may interpret its rules and orders over the telephone. A private party
may simply speak with agency staff and receive an interpretation of
agency law. Questions arise, however, when parties rely on this ad-
vice to their detriment. Can the agency change an interpretation once
it has given this advice? What if the advice relied upon was wrong?
Can a party seek judicial review of such interpretation? Usually an
agency is not bound by the advice of its staff38 and such advice is not
judicially reviewable. 39 The application of estoppel principles to
agency advice depends to a large degree on the extent of the reliance
by and the potential harm to the public.40 Many agencies, however,
agree to be bound by the informal advice, 41 and, as a practical mat-
ter, informal staff rulings are illustrative of what the agency itself is
likely to do.
The APA provides that an agency "may issue a declaratory order
to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty" and that such or-
ders are to have binding effect on the agency and the party in-
36. 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Chemical Manufacturers Association v. National Resources Defense
Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985)(upholding the EPA's creation of fundamentally different
factor (FDF) variances with respect to toxic pollutants in the face of statutory lan-
guage prohibiting the modification of standards for toxic pollutants); WAIT Radio v.
FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969) later app 459 F.2d 1203 cert. denied 409
U.S. 1027 (1972). (ordering the FCC to entertain requests for waivers from its "clear
channel" rules, noting that "a system where regulations are maintained inflexibility
without any procedure for waiver poses legal difficulties"). See also, Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983)(upholding Social Security Administration regulations estab-
lishing a "grid" of categories for considering disability appeals, but noting that an
administrative law-judge will not apply the rules contained is the guidelines when
they fail to describe a claimant's particular limitations. Id. at 462, n.5 and 467 n.11.
But see, Airline Pilots Assoc. Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2nd Cir. 1960)
(upholding FAA's refusal to grant any exceptions to its rule that all pilots reaching
the age of 60 must retire); see also, Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978); Rom-
bough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2nd Cir. 1979) Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir.
1979) See generally, Comment, "Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An Analysis
of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule," 33 Hastings L.J. 241 (1981).
38. See Wilmington Chem. Corp. v. Celebrezze, 229 F.Supp. 168 (N.D.Ill. 1964).
39. See authorities cited in supra n. 14.
40. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); but see,
Moser v. U.S., 341 U.S. 41 (1951). Discussed in Gellhorn & Boyer, at 129.
41. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 1.3 (1990) (Federal Trade Commission); 26 C.F.R.
§§ 602.201(a), 601.201(d) (1990) (Internal Revenue Service).
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volved.42 Such declaratory orders qualify as final agency action and
are reviewable in federal court. Because such declaratory orders are
produced only in the context of formal adjudicatory hearings, they are
rare.
43
The usual situation is somewhat analogous to that of a federal
litigant who seeks to challenge a law that has not, as yet, been ap-
plied to him. Article III requires that there be a real "case or contro-
versy."44 Because most agency declaratory advice is informal, such
litigants usually lack the requisite standing, and the case is not ripe
for judicial review. A litigant that disagrees with an agency's advice
or interpretation can most clearly obtain review by ignoring the ad-
vice and defending its own interpretation of the law in an enforce-
ment proceeding. In other contexts, the courts may be willing to step
in without requiring the party to risk civil or criminal penalties: for
example, courts have concluded that in some cases that certain no-
action letters issued by the SEC were sufficiently final to justify judi-
cial review.45
Since petitioners formally request the agency to waive the appli-
cation of an otherwise applicable rule, exceptions or waivers usually
result in more elaborate procedures, but normally less than formal
procedures. Usually the petitioner files an application, and interested
competitors often intervene. The denial or grant of relief is usually
treated as a final order. Exceptions requests usually focus on the par-
ticular needs of the applicants and the peculiar, distinct, and adverse
manner in which it is claimed a rule affects those needs. Such excep-
tions requests are necessarily adjudicatory in nature. Informal adju-
dicatory procedures are appropriate for such matters, but agency
processes vary in this regard.46 Some statutes authorizing equitable
relief may sometimes trigger the APA's formal adjudicatory proce-
dure.47 This, however, is not very common.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1988).
43. For a detailed treatment of this section of the APA, see Powell, "Agency Ad-
vice Giving," supra n. 29.
44. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S. Ct.
674 (1971). For agency declaratory orders, see Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d
681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
45. See Medical Committee for Human Right v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970) vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); but see, Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
46. For a detailed examination of the Department of Energy Exceptions Process,
see Schuck, "When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the For-
mulation of Energy Policy Through An Exceptions Process," 1984 Duke L. Rev. 163.
47. 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 824 (1978). See, e.g., Sea-
coast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle.
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B. Conditions and Commitments
Requests for exceptions, waivers and other adjustments are initi-
ated by the regulated. Such requests may result in clarification of
existing law or, in the case of exceptions and waivers, exemption from
certain rules altogether. They usually turn on the peculiar circum-
stances of the Petitioner involved. Agencies also can take the peculiar
facts of an applicant into account by tailoring their regulatory powers
to that entity.Indeed, somewhat akin to exceptions are conditional
orders or an applicant's advance voluntary consent to certain agency
actions. While exceptions and waivers often result in less regulation
for the regulated entities who seek them, conditions and commit-
ments usually represent a form of more specific, individual regula-
tory requirements. In both instances, regulation is being shaped
largely by the individual needs of the particular regulated entity with
which the agency deals.
Agencies usually exercise power to condition their orders on cer-
tain actions in response to an application for a license, merger au-
thorization, or some other kind of regulatory permission. In this
sense, the agency has something the applicant wants and a regula-
tory bargaining context potentially may be established. 48 The proce-
dural and substantive issues in these various application contexts
vary, but individualized petitions that seek permission to engage in
certain activity, such as building and operating a nuclear power plant
or merging with or acquiring a bank as part of a bank holding com-
pany enable the agency involved to condition its grant of authority. It
can, in effect, say "yes, but" and then provide certain regulatory re-
quirements, often quite specific to the factual circumstances of the
applicant involved. Conditional orders can thus be important regula-
tory tools in certain kinds of programs.
Conditions are particularly common in application proceedings,
such as those carried out pursuant to the Bank Holding Company
Act. 49 Because the nature of the application process is informal, a
great deal of negotiation occurs between the staff of the Federal Re-
serve Board (Board) and the applicants seeking Bank Holding Com-
pany status or the acquisition of a bank or nonbank. Orders are not
so much decreed as they are negotiated and, in that process, condi-
48. For a treatment of agency conditions, see Aman, "Bargaining For Justice: An
Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board," 74
Iowa L. Rev. 837 (1989); [hereinafter, "Bargaining For Justice"]. See also, Mashaw
and Tomlinson, "The Enforcement Of Federal Standards In Grant-In-Aid Programs:
Suggestions For Beneficiary Involvement," 58 Va. L. Rev. 600 (1972). Most application
processes are initially informal, though an ultimate denial of the benefits sought in
some programs may later result in more formal adjudication. See, e.g., Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988). See Aman, "Bargaining For Justice" id.
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tions are often attached by the Board before an applicant's request is
granted.50
Most Board proceedings, particularly at the early stages of the
application process, more accurately fit within a negotiation or bar-
gaining model of regulation. A decision made during the early stages
of the process appears to be, and often is, a joint decision. The appli-
cant, of course, wishes to have its application granted. The staff may
wish to do so, but may be troubled by certain aspects of the proposal.
They may suggest changes or condition approval upon commitments
the applicant is willing to make. Each party can obtain only what in
the end the other is prepared to allow. If staff and petitioner have a
different view of the legal significance of the facts presented in a par-
ticular application, informal discussions and bargaining may enable
one side to move closer to the other's point of view. Regulatory condi-
tions and voluntary commitments often play a significant role in this
phase of the process. Particularly from the applicants' point of view,
conditions and voluntary commitments are the very currency of the
negotiating process. The applicant will agree to conditions he knows
will guarantee the successful and speedy grant of his application. The
agency will seek conditions that assure it that the applicant merits
its standards and advances its policies.
The various substantive contexts in which an agency issues a
conditional order or agrees to grant certain authority in light of an
applicant's voluntary commitment to carry out or abstain from carry-
ing out certain activities raise a number of issues. In general, these
include questions of law, policy and fact. Working at this level of gen-
erality, at least five types of agency conditions or commitments are
possible.5 1 A perfect condition is one the is based on clear law, clear
agency policy and is narrowly tailored to the facts of a particular ap-
plicant before the agency. This kind of condition allows the agency to
tailor its regulatory demands to fit the precise situation of the appli-
cant before it. Such a condition, being so narrow and fact-specific, is
unlikely to have any precedential value. It allows the applicant to
obtain approval of its proposed action in a manner that ensures the
agency's regulatory duties and goals are full carried out. The infor-
mal give and take between agency staff and private counsel consti-
tute the only procedure available in most cases involving this kind of
informal agency action.
A second kind of condition can be called a policy condition such a
condition is fact-specific and within the agency's legal authority, but
50. For the most part, conditions are authorized by the Bank Holding Company
Act. See, e.g., Pauline B. Heller, Federal Bank Holding Company Law (1990) § 7.08,
7-62 n.10.
51. For examples of these five types of conditions and an analysis of their sub-




it may implicate policies not yet fully articulated by the agency. Such
conditions can raise procedural issues similar those involved in deter-
mining whether an agency should use adjudication or rulemaking
when formulating policy. But policy making at so early a stage in the
agency's proceedings, however, raises its own difficulties. The bar-
gaining process usually consists of a discussion between a staff mem-
ber of the agency and private counsel. By voluntarily agreeing to a
condition, the applicant knows that it can expedite its petition, but
such a conditions or voluntary commitment often are treated as es-
sentially a fait accompli by the agency that reviews the order. Policy
made in this manner, especially significant policy, does not begin to
receive the kind of public scrutiny applied to the results of rulemak-
ing proceedings. When the case proceeds to consideration by the full
commission or board, there may not have been a full policy review.
Given the voluntary nature of the commitment it is not likely that
courts will review this aspect of the order. Thus, the policy involved
receives even less outside scrutiny than if it had been developed in an
adjudication. This kind of ad hoc approach to policy making is thus
relatively invisible and not necessarily consistent or well thought out.
Conditions with significant policy implications are thus not appropri-
ate for the very informal processes of negotiation that occur in such
contexts.
An even more controversial third kind of condition is one in
which the parties agree to take or forego certain actions over which
the agency's actual regulatory authority is uncertain. An applicant
eager to close a deal or avoid protracted litigation may be willing to
agree to such a condition, thus allowing the agency to extend its regu-
latory jurisdiction informally and in a manner also is effectively im-
mune from judicial review. A fourth type of agency condition is one
that does not relate to the specific facts in the petition of the appli-
cant. Such a condition is wholly prospective in nature and designed to
prevent future action that may or may not be contemplated by the
applicant. This kind of regulation may avoid future litigation, but it
can be particularly coercive when demanded of an applicant whose
own factual situation does not necessarily raise or justify the restric-
tion. Finally, a fifth type of condition or commitment is the null condi-
tion, one that is clearly beyond the authority of the Commission to
impose, and thus not grounded in any known or articulated policy,
and is not even fact-specific to the applicant involved.
These types of conditions have both legal and policy effects. Since
most of them are negotiated informally, they create law in an entirely
informal manner. They usually come out of the bargaining phase of
the administrative process and, as such, are not subject to the kinds
of procedural checks found in more adversarial phases of the process.
Given the often voluntary nature of the agreement between appli-
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cants and agency staff, neither the policy implications nor the respec-
tive merits of these conditions are likely to be reviewed either by the
full commission granting the applications or a court reviewing the
process.
Nevertheless, attaching conditions to orders is an effective regu-
latory device. Conditions not only allow an application to proceed, but
do so in a manner that is legally sound. Overuse of conditions, how-
ever, particularly those that are not fact-specific and grounded on
reasonably clear agency authority and policy, can raise some thorny
questions. Applicants seeking governmental benefits are seldom in a
strong bargaining position. Applicants in the Bank Holding Act con-
text, for example, are usually putting together financial deals that
require quick action and approval. Their ability to bargain with the
agency or pursue litigation to prove their point is likely to be limited
by the realities of the transactions they wish to undertake. In such
contexts, the voluntary nature of the commitments they enter into
may be exaggerated.
Unwise use of conditions can also have adverse policy effects. If
the condition agreed to raises important policy issues, it is not likely
the full Board will consider it thoroughly. Conditions that have al-
ready been agreed upon are likely to be seen as a fait accompli. This
is particularly true when the policies involved are not readily appar-
ent, controversial or both. Indeed, the manner in which such condi-
tions are publicized may also have adverse rule of law effects. For
example, to the extent that conditions appear only in letters of trans-
mittal between the parties and the agency, they may constitute a
form of secret law. This is particularly true if they contain policy im-
plications of significance beyond the particular applicant in the case,
and not publicized or made easily accessible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Informality and informal actions are and have always been an
important part of the U.S. administrative process. This paper has dis-
cussed two forms of informal action - administrative equity and con-
ditional orders. It has suggested that the future of informal actions
such as these needs to be assessed in a context marked by increasing
global competition and the need for increased governmental effi-
ciency. It is likely that administrative equity in market oriented re-
gimes will be seen as actually advancing the market goals of the
programs involved rather than as departure from them. To the ex-
tent that conditional orders are attached by agencies to assure com-
pliance with market goals, they will be easier to understand as truly
voluntary commitments. Indeed, informal action can usefully be ana-
lyzed in terms of the extent of support that exists for the governmen-
tal action involved, as well as the resources an agency has to carry
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out its statutory mission. As we move toward regulatory regimes that
are more market oriented in their substantive goals and the regula-
tory means by which they achieve those goals, informal agency action
is likely to increase. The use of procedure as a source of protection
from government is likely to abate, considerably. The use of informal
actions to promote economic goals largely shared by industry and
government is likely to increase.
At the same time, a second trend in U.S. administrative law is
also likely to encourage informality - the lack of budgetary re-
sources most federal agencies now are experiencing. When there are
fewer and fewer personnel to administer and enforce traditional
agency rules and policies, informal ways of proceeding are likely to
result as a matter of necessity. In short, as budgets become tighter
and substantive regulation becomes more market oriented, informal
action is less likely to be seen as an illegitimate attempt to accom-
plish certain governmental tasks. Rather, it is increasingly likely to
be seen as a cost effective way of enabling government to operate in a
more effective, if less ambitious, manner.

